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pardon binding without an acceptance would be forcing a person to admit guilt, in a case where he might prefer to suffer punishment, though innocent of any crime, than to confess a crime which he has never committed, in order to escape punishment. In Alabama and Ohio it has been held that acceptance of a pardon will be presumed where there is no evidence to rebut such a presumption. *Ex Parte Powell*, *supra*; *Sterling v. Drake*, 29 Ohio St. 457, 23 Am. Rep. 762. In Ohio it has also been held that where the Governor commutes a death sentence by substituting therefor life imprisonment, in a case where the person convicted has become a lunatic, such convict on being restored to reason is bound by the commutation, it being presumed that he has accepted. *In re Victor*, 31 Ohio St. 206. In view of the fact that a lunatic has no legal capacity to contract this decision may justly be doubted.

PARENT AND CHILD—EFFECT OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT UPON PARENT'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR INJURY TO CHILD.—Plaintiff's minor son was injured while in the employ of the defendant, and plaintiff sued for the loss caused to himself by this injury. It was admitted that plaintiff had a good cause of action unless it was barred by the Workman's Compensation Act. The Act provided that the right of action of an injured employee shall be waived, unless he gives notice that he claims his common law rights. The court held, that the Act did not bar plaintiff's right of action. *King v. Viscoloid Co.*, (Mass. 1914), 106 N. E. 988.

At common law when a minor child was injured by the wrongful act of another, the parent gained a right of action for damages for loss of services and medical expenses. *Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Schaefer*, 121 Ill. App. 334; *McCarthy v. Guild*, 12 Metc. 291. This right of action is independent of the right of action of the injured child, and the court in the principal case held that the child's waiver was by operation of law a discharge of his own right, but that no discharge of his right could take away the right which had become vested in the parent. The statute expressly states the consequence that is to follow the failure to give the statutory notice, the court therefore held that it could not say that further consequences should follow by taking away the right of a third person not mentioned in the statute. In arriving at this conclusion the court followed the recognized canons of statutory construction. *Dubuque v. Dubuque*, 7 Ia. 262; *Page v. Bartlett*, 101 Ala. 193. The court cannot read into a statute a provision which the legislature did not see fit to put there, whether the omission resulted from inadvertence or from a set purpose, *City of Pittsburg v. Kalchthaler*, 114 Pa. St. 547; *Child v. Child*, 185 Mass. 376. And by another rule of construction an existing common law right of action is not to be taken away by statute unless by direct enactment or by necessary implication, *Com. v. Beck*, 187 Mass. 15. The legislature could have provided, as seems to have been done by the legislature of Rhode Island, that the election between the statutory remedy and that given by the common law should be made by the parent of the minor employee and should bind both parent and child. RHODE ISLAND WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT, § 6.